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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
HYDE P.A . .R.I~ TO\Y-N. 
a Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
. vs. 
G-EORGE CR.UIBERS .A .. ND 
J, .A C Y CIL.-L.\IBERS. His 
Wife, E. S. CHAMBERS, a 
Single Man, BERTHA POUL-
SEN, as Guardian of ADELL 
IDA POlLSEX, a Minor, 
D~\ VID J. WEEKS~ and 
?\L~RY WEEKS, His "\Vife, 
Defendants and Respondent3. 1 
Appeal From First Judicial District Court in and 
for Cache County 
Honorable Lewis Jones, Judge 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
In entering upon the preparation of a reply 
brief in this cause, we are impressed with thP 
thought that there is little excuse for any extended 
elaboration of our contentions, as set forth in thr· 
original brief. 
We have already given our vie\v~ as fully and 
emphasized them as thoroughly as pO'ssible; and our 
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2 
opponent's have made their answer thereto. The 
p1·incipal necessity for a reply arises from various 
state1nent·s and conclusions in our opponents' brief 
which, in our opinion, are not supported by the 
record. 
At the outset, on page one of respondents' 
ibrief, it is stated that ''It is the contention of the 
defendants (respondent's) tha.t even though there. 
was no express agreement that they should give up 
their culinary streams as a part of the considera-
tion of the town ,granting them these taps, that un-
der all the facts and circumstances there was an 
implied agreement that as a consideration for such 
taps the plaintiff (appellant) could have any addi-
tional \vater that might be saved from the culinary 
stream·s of the defendants. . . . . '' ThP same 
argument is advanced elsewhere in their brief 
(Pages 16, 22-23, 29). 
Our opponents make no attempt to point out 
any tes.timony in the record to support. this bald 
conclusion. Had there been any basis for the posi-
tion taken by them] it would have been a simple 
matter to refer to the testimony on which they re-
lied. We have searched the record, from beginning 
to end, and now as:sert without fear of contradiC-
tion that there is no testimony tending to prove the 
existence of any implied agreement. 
On page 23 of their brief, we find this further 
statement: ''The fact that on cros·s examination 
Mr. Weeks did not expressly mention the giving up 
of the culinary stream, does not change the fact 
1that he did give up the stream, a fact which is not 
disputed in this case.'' Presumably, from this 
statement, counsel intended to have the Court be-
lieve that while there may have been some teRti-
many on cross examination tending to prove that 
there was no other consideration given for the tap 
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,) 
"~ater, over and nbovP the right of "·ny, there was 
no such evidence to be found in the direct testi-
mony. 
An examination of the record discloses, both on 
c~irect and cross exan1ina tion, very definite testi-
mony to the effect that 1·espondents gave nothing, 
over and above the right of "·ay, for the t.ap stream's 
whieh they received from appellant. Further-
more, it is very clear in the evidence that the pre-
decessor of the re·s.pondent Chamber~ (John P. 
Toolson) never had or claiined any culinary 
stream; hence he, at least, could ·give no ·such addi-
tional consideration to appellant. 
MR. "\\EEI~~. on c~irect examination, tes-
tified as follows (Trans. 81; ~\.b. 31) : 
''Q. (By MR. HARRIS): All right, can 
you tell us in substance what the state-
ment ''as~ tht proposition "Tas, that you 
mentioned! 
A. \\ell, they ask if a dribble, they said, 
would be enough to do· us. I said, yes, for 
culinary purpose:'. 
Q. All right. They a~ked you if you 
would be sath;fied with a dribble through 
the pipe line? 
4-:\.. Yes sir. 
Q. What n·ere you to give them for that? 
A. I was to give them a right of way. 
Q. lVhat if anything was said to you, what 
you were to give? 
A. They said for the right of way." 
The foregoing testimony, apparently, wa~ 
overlooked by respondents. 
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What the same vvi tnes s (Weeks) s.aid on cross 
examination, was equally explicit. We quote (Tr. 
115-116; A b. 36) : 
'' Q. For thi·s tap stream that you re-
ceived, you gave Hyde Pa.rk the right to 
run this pipe line over your ground~ 
A. Yes, it was their idea. I ought to have 
enough good water to drink -
Q. You traded a right of way over your 
land for this tap; that is correct isn't it~ 
A. "\Vhy, I guess you would call that 
correct 
Q. I·s that what you did~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't pay them any money for 
it did you~ 
A. Pay them any money~ 
Q. Yes. 
A. What do you call land and property~ 
Q. Just answer my question. You didn't 
pay any amount of cash did you~ 
A. No. 
Q. For this tap stream they gave you; 
you gave them a right of way over your 
land? 
A. Yes ·sir, it was their proposition. 
Q. Yes, and that is all you gave them? 
A. Well, here -
Q. Just answer that question yes or no. 
(Objection). 
Q. Is that what you gave, this right of 
way? 
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. .:\.. Y e·s, and the dronag-es they da1naged. 
I don't ~ay nothing about the dantagP~, 
they haY~ damaged me before. 
Q. You mean in pa~~ing over your land 1 
.. ...\... Yes sir, in digging it up several times. 
Q. That is all you g~Ye them Y 
A. That i'S all I got. 
Q. That i~ you got the tap stream didn't 
you, for the time being! 
A. Nothing said about the time being. 
Q. For a certain time-
A. I gave up the right of way. 
Q. Until this spring you got a tap spring~ 
A. \\hich spring·? 
Q. l~ n til the spring of 1939 ~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. That is correct~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And for that you allowed them to pass 
over your land mth their pipe~ 
A. Ain't that about enough to pass over 
that.'' 
The record disclose-s that the respondent Weeks 
owned the land in 1911 and was a party, to the nego-
tiations with appellant. The other res.pondent, l\f r. 
Chambers, acquired his land subsequent to the 
1911 negotiations. His predecessor in interest, 
John P. Toolson, held the land_ when appellant con-
structed its pipe line across what is now the 
Chambers property. 
On the question of the consideration paid for 
the tap water, :!fr. Toolson testified for respond-
ents as fo1lows (Tr. 128; Ab. 37-38): 
''Q. Did you have some talk about what 
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kind of a deal that you "rould make for the 
water right~ 
A. I think I did. We had met in that 
capacity several times. I don't recall who 
they were, even. 
Q. You don't recall who they were~ 
A. I have heard, but I don't recall. 
Q. All right. Do you recall the substance 
of what was ·said about extending that pipe 
line across this fifty acres of land~ 
MR. YOUNG: Yes or no. 
MR. HARRIS: Q. Do you remember 
\vha.t the substance of it was~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right, can you state to the court, 
in your own language, the suhs,tance of 
what was· said about constructing this pipe 
line~ 
A. They asked for a right of V\ray -
MR. YOUNG: That :is objected to as in-
competent, irrelevant and immaterial, a 
proper foundation not having been laid, 
not being shown that he talked to any offi-
cer of Hyde Park, or any one authorized 
to make statements and admission on be-
half of the town. 
1fR. HAR,RIS: We will follow it up by 
showing that Hyde Park did actually carry 
out this agreement. 
THE CO·URT: Overruled. 
MR. HARRIS: Q. You may s.tate the 
substance of what was said. 
A. ·well they came for a right of way 
across my land, and in the discussion I 
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asked theu1 for a tap for 'rater. 'l"hey didn't 
seen1 to n1ake much objection. They said 
most of them 'vanted money for their right 
of ""ay. I also askt.\d about n trough. 
They didn't know about that. ''T e ·got to-
gether on that matter.'' 
QUESTIOKS INVOLVED 
l~ nder this heading, on page 2 of their brief, 
counsel state that '• The primary question involved 
is: Did the plaintiff show such fact·s as to con-
stitute a necessity for this condemnation pro-
ceeding!'' 
"We respectfully submit that the 'So-called pri-
mary question con-stitutes no issue on this appPal. 
A.ppellant commenced the action and sought to con-
demn a right-of-way for its new pipe line over the 
lands of respondents. Respondents answered, and 
the court held that appellaut already had a right 
of way, and that no order of condemnation \va:s 
necessary. In their amended answer and counter-
claim, respondents appealed to the court to de-
termine their right to tap water from appellant's 
pipe line. Appellant joined issue and the case wa~ 
tried and decided by the trial court on that issue, 
and on that issue alone. Under the judgment of 
the court, respondents were held to be entitled to 
thP use of a tap connected with appellant's pipe 
line, to supply them and their ·successors in intPr-
est with sufficient culinary water for human con-
sumption and for stock watering purposes. 
All of the assignments of appellant are direct-
ed to this phase of the controversy between the 
parties. K o-assignment whatever went to the rul-
ing of th~ court relating to appellant's right of 
co-ndemnation. The ref ore, thi·s so-called primary 
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question has no place at all in the case. And par-
ticularly is this so in view of the fact that respond-
ents also failed to make any crO'ss.-assignment of 
error in relation thereto. 
Where a matter is not challenged, either by an 
assignment or cross.-as:signment of error, it is not 
before the court for review. 
Meissner, et al v. Ogden L. & I. Ry. Co. 
etal, 65 Utah 1 ; 233 Pac. 569. 
Perrin v. U. P. R. Co., 59- Utah 1; 201 Pac. 
405. 
Teakle v. R .. R., 32 Utah 276; 80 Pac. 
402. 
ASSIGNMENT NO. 2 
In their consideration of .A:ss.ignment of Error 
No. 2, respondents, beginning on page 4 of their 
·brief, take the position that the contract between 
appellant and respondents was valid because appeL 
lant owned a surplus of water over and above the 
needs of its ·citizens. It is our contention that this 
Inatter is wholly immaterial. The contract was not 
based upon the exrstence of any surplus. In fact, 
·no mention \vas made of surplus at any time. 
Respondents grounded the right to a tap stream 
on an oral contract entered into hy the parties in 
t.he year 1911. The record shows that in that year, 
and for many years immediately subsequent thPre-
to, appellant was constantly short of water, so 
short in fact that app·ellant ·sp·ent money on s.evera.l 
occasions in successive years to tap sources. of 
WJater ·supply higher up in Birch Creek . Canyon 
than the point of the· original intake. Certainly. 
this is the best kind of proof that there was an 
actual shortage of water, otherwise, the officers of 
appellant would never have spent money on such 
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undertakings. The te~tin1ony of all the 'vitnPsses 
bears out fully the exi~tl'llee of such shortage. 
'\llate\er te~ti1nony "~as offered by respond-
ents, tending to proYe thl• pos'Sibility of a surplus, 
pertained entirely to the yen rs since the cons.truc-
tion of the last pipe line in about the year. 1935. 
It would seem that the rig·ht~ of the parties must 
have been fixed long before this time, and that the 
court could not make a eontract for the parties 
based upon a surplus. if any such there be, coming 
into exi'Stence some twenty-three or four years 
after the date of the contract. Especially is this 
HO in the light of tl1e evidence that appellant never 
did alloW" respondents to take "·ater out of the new 
pipe line after it 'vas constructed. The theory of 
respondents in their cross complaint was certainly 
not based upon the existence of a surplus in 1911; 
the theory "as based "holly and solely upon rights 
growing out of an exchange alleged to have been 
made in that year. 
Before concluding our reference to this part 
of counsel's brief, "e ''-ish to point out that G;eo. 
Z. Lamb was not the mayor of the Hyde Park 
Board in 1911, as contended on page 7 of their 
brief. )[r. Lamb "·as a member of the board and 
wa.termaster in that year. (Tr. 209; A b. 58). 
ASSIGNMENT NO. 7 
Respondents next take up the ·several matters 
considered by appellant on the question of the in-
sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial 
court's finding No. 13, to which appellant's AR·sign-
ment of Error No. 7 was directed. 
We feel that the questions involved! were adequately 
covered in our original brief. There would ~eem 
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to be but one matter to which we think the court's 
attention should be called: On page 13 it js stated 
that "There is evidence as to the number of cattle 
that both ·weeks and Chambers had on their 
premises, . . . . '' 
Again, couns.el fail to point out any testimony 
in the record to support their position. Further-
more, it will be noted the assignment of error un-
\der consideration was not directed to what the evi-
dence did or did not sho,v, but rather to the failure 
1of the court to make any finding at all a·s to the 
number of cattle customarily kept on the premises. 
Had such a finding been made, then appellant 
could have determined from the record wheth0.r or 
not there was evidence to ~)upport that finding. 
We might also point out that at no time during 
the, trial of the case was the ·slightest atten1pt n1adc 
to es,tablish the number of cattle ":rhich the pre~ 
decessor of the respondent, Chambers, n1aintained 
on his premi·ses; nor, the nun1ber of cattle ,,,.hieh 
that respondent maintained there after he becan1e 
the owner of the premises. 
THE CONTRAC~r 'rO DEiji\TER \V ~~'"rER ~rO 
THESE DEFENDANTS ·WAS V.1\LID AND 
BINDING. 
This phase of the controversy is discussed by 
respondents, ~beginning on page 15 of their brief. 
It is contended that the oral contract entered 
into in 1911 for the exchange of a right of \vay for 
a tap stream, wa·s not a. contract in perpetuity but 
rather merely an exchange of property or property 
rights for other property. This seems to be the 
extent of respondents.' argument on this point. 
Their claim of a vested intere·st accruing in 
1911 is contrary to . the position taken by them 
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:earlier in the brief: also, it is contrary to the posi-
tion taken by tlu~In iinnll'diately follo,ving, on pa.ge 
16 of their brief. They state: .. It ~was, a mere 
agree1nent to ~upply 'Yater out of the exce·ss water 
o'vned by the plaintiff.'' 
This latter position is clearly inconsistent 
with the Yiew that a Yested property right was 
given. The contract upon "·hich respondent·s based 
their claim required that appellant keep the pipe 
line, used to deliver their water, in a good state of 
repair at all time'S, and also required that when the 
same became worn out that it be replaced by appel-
lant. Certainly, one could not say that the rights 
were· determined entirely in 1911 as contended for 
by reospondent~ on page 15 of their brief. 
In our original brief we cited ample authority 
for our contention that a contract such as respond-
ents claim was entered into by the parties in 1911, 
could not be a perpetual contract but. rather 
would be a contract terminable at will. Respond-
ents urge that th0se authorities are not in point. 
We call the attention of the Court, however, to· the 
fact that the principle decided by thofe cases was 
moost decidedly in point, that is, that where a city 
rurports to contract _in perpetuity, the court·s will 
construe such contract to be terminable at will. 
Applying such a principle to the case at bar,· appeL 
lant would have a right to ·terminate at will the 
contract contended for by respondent.· In the in-
stant case, it is clear that appellant did terminate 
the contract, if, in fact, any such contract ever 
existed. 
On the question of the statute of frauds con-
·stituting a bar to the contract now s-ought to be 
enforced, res·pondents cite Section 33-5-8, Revisecl 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, reading as follows: 
''Kothing in this chapter contained shall 
be construed to abridge the powers of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
court to cornpel the specific performance 
of agreements in case of part performance 
thereof.'' 
'l,wo cas.es are cited bearing upon this same ques-
tion: Brinton v. Van Cott, 8 Ut. 480; 53 P. 218; 
Lynch v. Coviglio, 17 Ut. 106; 35 P. 983. 
Respondents are in error in claiming that this 
~eetion and the cases cited construing the same, 
apply to contracts not to be performed in one year . 
.... t\.s a matter of fact, the doctrine of ''part per-
formance'' applies only to contracts relating to 
real estate. See 
Williston on Contracts, Section 533. 
The t\vo cases cited involve contracts pertain-
ing to real estate and the Utah Court properly 
applied the doctrine of part performance. But the 
case at bar mus,t be clearly distinguished from ·such 
a doctrine. 
While it is clear that respondent·s could have 
performed all or part of their agreement within 
one year, yet appellant could not have done so, !or 
the reason that it) under respondents' contention, 
was required to deliver water to them for all time. 
Appellant contends that the statute of fraud's 
applies to such a contract and renders it unenforce-
able. Mr. Williston, in Section 504 of his 'vork on 
(~on tracts, ·states: 
''There are numerous decisions which 
seem supported by a more reasonable con-
struction of the statute which holds that if 
after full performance on one 'Side, per-
formance on the other side still oonnof· 
take place within a year, the statute is 
applicable; and any redress which can be 
obtained for either full or partial perform-
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ance must be based on principles of quasi-
contract. ' ' 
In a note found in 
Volume 138, American State Re·ports, 
at page 610, 
the same view expressed by l\Ir. vVilliston is stated 
as being the more logical. Each of these references 
is based on cases cited in connection with the text 
and is supported by these authorities. 
CONSTIT"CTIOXALITY OF THE QUESTIO·N 
On page 18 of their brief, respondents. cite two 
Colorado cases and one California cas.e. The 
principle decided by the cases can be ·stated ters.ely 
as follows: C9ntracts entered into by a municipal-
ity in its proprietary capacity, are not restricted 
by public policy to the same extent as where the 
city i'8 acting in its governmental capacity. 'fhe 
cases cited held that in. contracting with respect to 
water supply the city acted in its proprietary 
capacity, and that it had the same powers in that 
capacity as an ordinary ~rporation. They ~:re 
not in point with the case at bar, for the rea·son 
that cities in Utah are expressly restricted, in their 
power in attempting to sell or exchange water 
rights or sources of water ·supply, by the constitu-
tional pro\ision referred to in appellant's original 
brief. None of the cases cited by respondent 
makes.reference to any ·statutory or constitutional 
limitation of powers. Certainly the Utah cases 
cited on page 19 of respondents' brief do not con-
sider the question involved in the case at bar. 
The Ellerheck ca·se (Ellerbeck v. Salt I.nke 
City, 29 Ut. 361; 81 P. 273) merely holds that if a 
city exchanges its water for other water, or water 
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rights, the quantities of the water may be differ-
ent; so long as the water exchanged is of equal 
value the requirements of the con·stitutional pro-
vision are met. To be more exact, Salt Lake City 
.attempted to exchange irrigation water, not fit for. 
culinary use, for a much less quantity of water 
suitable for culinary purposes, and the Court held 
that it 'yas. immate'rial that the quantities were 
'different, if the value to the city 'vas substantially 
equal. 
The case of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City 
Water & Electric P'o.,ver Company (24 Utah 249; 
67 P. 672; 25 Utah 456; 71 P. 1069) ha:s no connec-
6on with the case at bar at all. However~ this 
much might be said: Salt Lake City, of cours.e, 
never had any right to water. It merely had a 
right to use water if it could place it to beneficial 
u·se. Beneficial use was the limit of its right and 
the Court held that any water not placed to ben-
eficial use by the city was public water and was 
fnbject to appropriation by any other person. 
We find it impossible to see any connection 
'between either of thes.e cases and the case at bar. 
On pag-e 21 of their brief, re·spondents refer 
to two contracts entered into between Smithfield 
Irrigation Company and appellant. The first con-
tract is dated July 9, 1912. It provides in effect 
that appellant would give to the Smithfield Irriga-
tion District, 25 acres of water right from the 
Logan and Richmond Irrigation District, and that 
appellant should have the right to divert from 
Birch Creek certain water for its own purposes. 
The amount of the water involved is. not stated, ex-
cept that the water delivered by appellant to the 
irrigation district was to be twice as much as the 
w··ater diverted by appellant from. Birch Creek 
(~anyon. It was further provided that appellant 
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should pay tl1e a'SBt:"BBUH:"nts levied on the water 
right which it transferred to the Smithfield Irriga_ 
tion District.. From the aets of the parties, it is a 
fair inference to say that the 8mithfield Irrigation 
District, 'vhich di~trict i~ no'v Smithfield Irriga-
tion Company, a corporation, "~as to be required to 
delh ... er to appt>llant, out of Birch Creek Canyon, 
at least half as n1uch "-ater a:s. appellant delivered 
to the irrigation district. It i~ also ·a fair infer-
ence to ·say that the parties recognized that the 
origina'l diversion f.rom Birch Creek Canyt>n hy 
appellant ga\e appellant less water than that 
amount, and, thertfore, no opposition "~as raised 
to the repeated efforts of appellant to get more 
water out of Birch Cre~k Canyon, by extending its 
diversion point to additional 'Springs located higher 
np the canyon. Thi~ condition seemed to have 
existed until finally, in 1935, appellant decided to 
extend its intake to a much· larger spring situated 
in Birch Creek Canyon, v.hich spring is the pre·s-
ent intake of app~llant 's system. In 1935, on the 
22nd day of January, the second contract referred 
-to in respondents' brief \\as entered jnto between 
appellant and the Smithfield Irrigation Company. 
This contract expressly provided that appellant 
should be entitled to .50 of a second foot of the flow 
of the waters of this spring:- and that all of the 
flow of the spring above that amount should re-
main the property of the Smithfield Irrigation. 
Company, and should be allowed to continue to flo"' 
down Birch Cref?k. Thus the partie·s, by written 
contract, recognized the right of appellant to con-
tinue to take other sources of water supply . in 
sufficient quantity to guarantee the amount con-
tracted to be delivered to appellant, thereby recog-
nizing the same course of ~onduct as the parties 
had actually worked under before the execution of 
this latter contract. A. -further provision 'vas, that 
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if, in the future, this source should fail, appellant 
\vould be entitled to use other sources of supply to 
guarantee the quantity of water so granted. 
The contract al'so provided as follows: 
"It is further understood and agreed that 
the party of the second part (appellant) 
will quit clailn to the party of the first 
part all of its right, title and interest, if 
any, in the "\va.ters of Birch Creek, save 
and except only, the \Vaters hereinafter 
referred to." 
_, Re·spondents interpret this to mean that appel-
lant quit claimed to the irrigation company water~ 
which it had received from respondents. Certain-
ly the contract does not justify the assumption of 
respondent in this particular. The contract recited 
that a di·spute had arisen bet,veen the parties with 
res,pect to the ownership of certain waters in Birch 
Creek Canyon. This contract was entered into to 
settle that dispute. The contract further provided 
that the appellant would pay to the Smithfield 
I rriga.tion Company the sum of $500.00. Counsel 
3ay that this \vas in lieu of the provisions in the 
old contract that appellant would pay the asses.;:;-
ments on the stock transferred to the irrigation 
company. This as·sumption may, or may not, be 
correct. The contract does not state why the 
$500.00 vvas paid, and as far as we know, there is 
no evidence to justify the a·ssumption of respond-
ents in this respect. 
\tV e have referred to these contracts a.t con-
siderable length to ans\ver the claim that appellant 
acquired \Vater rights from re·spondents. The rec-
ord shows that appellant claims .50 of a second 
foot of water which it acquired from the Smith-
field Irrigation Company. It never clain1ed any 
further rights, and it does not no\Y receive any 
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greater right~. .J.:\s a llHlt.ter of fact, it is a fair 
inference fron1 t11e record that previous to 1935 
the Sn1ithfield Irrigation Con1pany, or its pre-
dece~~~.•r in intere~t. the irrigation dist riet, never 
actually delivered to appellant a:s much water as 
it was oblig'ated to deliYer by Yirtue of the con-
tract of 1911. 
On page :2:2. respondents again repeat that they 
do not claim under any express contract but claim 
that it ''a~ implied from the conduct of the parties 
that re'Spondents granted to appellant certain 
waters in Birch Creek. ~\gain, we say, that there 
is no evidence in the record tending in any degree 
to prove any such implied agreement bet\\~een thf:' 
parties. Certainly., the respondent Chambers, who 
never had any culinary stream, could not make the 
slighteost pretense to the existence of any such im-
plied agreement. It is true that }Ir. Weeks said 
that he had abanoned his culinary stream after he 
received the tap water. But he did not claim tha.t 
this action zcas induced b'!-J any request or repre-
sentation of tlle (!_ppellant or any of its officers, 
and did not sho·n· ho1r a p pcllant 'loas or co~tld be 
benefitted by his abandonment in any amount 
uJhatsoerer. Throughout respondents' brief the 
claim is constantly made that previous to 1911 the 
respondent Weeks had a steady stream of water 
which he used for culinary purpo·ses; that he 
abandoned this water and that appellant ""'~as the 
0eneficiary of this abandonment. I Not only, how-
ever, does respondent Weeks fail to show how 
appellHnt could possibly have benefitted from thi's 
abandonment, but the claim in this regard is in-
consistent with other parts of his own testimony. 
On page 115 of the Tran~cri pt, 36 of the ~hstract, 
he testified that he and one Reed, a neighbor, con-
structed the ditch themselves and later on he gave 
rights in the ditch to other parties (not to appel-
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lant); that as a result of this disposal of hi·s rights 
he and his grantees "\Vere forced to take turns from 
the ditch from then on. Thus the reason that this 
respondent does not have a steady s.tream, at least 
during the high water s.eason, is apparent: He dis-
[JOsed of so 1nuch of his rig·hts in the ditch that his 
turn came at intervals, too infrequent to meet his 
requiren1ents. Had he retained ali of his original 
rights he would have been able to make use of his 
ditch for culinary purposes. 
Beginning at page 24 of their brief, respond-
ents discuss three Utah case's, and certain sections 
of the Utah statute. 
Section 15-8-14, R. S. Utah, permits a city to 
t-:ell its surplus "later outt:.ide of the city limits. In 
~:he Genola case ( Genola v. Santaquin, 96 Ut. 104; 
85 P. (2d) 790) the Court ·stated that this meant 
a sale to its ultimate consumers in the same 'vay 
as it sold water to the citizens of the town; that is. 
to ·~ay, if the city actually had a S1J;rpl us it might 
serve a resident of contiguous territory upon the 
same terms and conditions as it serves its own 
citizens. But manifestly it does not mean that a 
contract such as contended for by the respondents 
would be authorized under this section of the stat_ 
ute. For further clarification of this view, refer-
ence is again made to the language of Mr. Justice 
\Volfe in the Genola case quoted on page 23 of 
appellant's original brief. 
Of course, the case of Muir v. Murray City, 55 
U t. 368 ; 186 P. 433, the first case discussed under 
the heading beginning on page 24, has no relation-
Rhip to the case at bar. It merely held that Murray 
City could borrow money for the purpo·se of con-
~tructing a power line outside of the city limits. 
The two other cases ap·pearing under the s.ame 
heading (Ellerbeck v. Salt Ijake City, 29 lJt. 361; 
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81 P. ~73; Brununit Y. \Y'nter \\' orks Co., ~~;~ Ut. 
~8~); 93 P. 8~~)) havl~ alrl~ndy l'l'C.eived a.tt~ntion 
el-se"·here in thiB brief. They in no sense authorize 
a city to enter into a rontraet to deliYer a definite 
~-.mount of "~ater in perpetuity. Yet, if effect is 
to be given to the arg1.m1ent:s advanced by our 
opponent5. nothing- :short of that very thing; would 
be required of appellant. 
For the reasons herein set forth, \Ye urge that 
the case should be remanded to the trial court for 
further proce~dings. 
Re'Spectfully submitted, 
YO-cXG & BlLLEK AXD 
IR\"'I~""E5 SKEEX, THURMAN & MINER, 
~ttorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
Dated February 9, 1940. 
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